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Health and the Political Agency of Women†
By Sonia Bhalotra and Irma Clots-Figueras*
We investigate whether women’s political representation in state 
legislatures improves public provision of antenatal and childhood 
health services in the districts from which they are elected, arguing 
that the costs of poor services in this domain fall disproportionately 
upon women. Using large representative data samples from India and 
accounting for potential endogeneity of politician gender and the sample 
composition of births, we find that a 10 percentage point increase in 
women’s representation results in a 2.1 percentage point reduction in 
neonatal mortality, and we elucidate mechanisms. Women’s political 
representation may be an underutilized tool for addressing health in 
developing countries. (JEL D72, I12, I15, J16, O15, O17)
I. Motivation and Summary
This paper investigates the political economy of public health provision, focus-ing upon the relevance of political identity and, in particular, the gender of poli-
ticians. The widespread failure of public health provision in developing countries 
is commanding increasing attention in the global arena (Black, Morris, and Bryce 
2003) and in India (Chaudhury et al. 2006; Das Gupta 2005; Muralidharan et al. 
2011). Poverty is not a compelling explanation for the scale of (maternal and) child 
death given that most deaths can be averted with low cost interventions (Cutler, 
Deaton and Lleras-Muney 2006). The evidence points to political failure (Kiefer 
and Khemani 2003; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006) but the idea that public health 
services may suffer from the underrepresentation of women in government has not 
received dedicated consideration. In our sample, in India, 10 percent of children 
die before the age of one and less than 4 percent of state legislators are women. We 
investigate whether these phenomena are causally related
Preference differences between the sexes identified in numerous settings sug-
gest that women are more likely than men to (i) invest in children and (ii) favor 
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 redistribution.1 This suggests that women may be more likely to deliver public 
health improvements in developing countries because there are sharp positive age 
and income gradients in health and the essential policy challenge lies in addressing 
the early life health and survival of children in poor families.2 Moreover, the ben-
efits of interventions in this area flow differentially to women because they dispro-
portionately bear the costs of weak reproductive and child health services. Women 
carry the burden of high fertility and child mortality: they care for the sick, witness 
their children die, have further births, and risk dying in childbirth.3 In line with our 
hypothesis, the enfranchisement of women in early twentieth century America led 
to a sharp rise in state health expenditure and a steep drop in infant mortality (Miller 
2008). And results of the British Election Survey of 2001 show that the single most 
important concern for men is low taxes while, for women, it is the quality of the 
National Health Service (Campbell 2004).4
We investigate whether women’s political representation in state legislatures in 
India influences policy outcomes for individuals in the districts from which they are 
elected. Data on health outcomes, health-related behaviors, and village-level access 
to health facilities for a large representative sample of individuals are matched to 
the gender composition of state legislators around the time of their birth and in 
the district of their birth. The main identification challenge is that the gender of a 
competitively elected leader is likely to be correlated with voter preferences and 
hence endogenous. A second potential source of bias is that the composition of 
births is endogenous to the political regime. We address these problems using a fixed 
effects instrumental variables estimator that exploits constituency-level information 
on close elections between men and women on the one hand, and information on 
siblings in a large sample survey on the other. We test our identifying assumptions.
Consider the size of the estimated impacts on neonatal and infant mortality, 
which are markers of the state of public health in developing countries. We find that 
a one standard deviation increase in women’s political representation in the birth 
year (and similarly in the two years preceding birth) results in a 1.5 percentage 
point (24 percent) reduction in neonatal mortality, which is a 0.06 standard devia-
tion change. An alternative expression of effect sizes is that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the share of women elected from the index district to state assembly 
1 On (i), see Thomas 1990; Thomas and Welch 1991; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 
1997; Case 1998; Svaleryd 2002; Besley and Case 2003. One possible explanation of this is paternity uncertainty 
(Alexander 1974). On (ii), see Besley and Case 2000; Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001; Edlund and Pande 2002; 
Edlund, Haider, and Pande 2005; Warner and Steel 1999; Washington 2008; Oswald and Powdthavee 2010. This has 
been linked to women being, on average, less likely to pay taxes and more likely to receive benefits (e.g., Alessina 
and La Ferrara 2005).
2 Early childhood death accounts for 30 percent of all deaths in poor countries compared with 1 percent in richer 
countries (Cutler et al. 2007). There are vast inequalities in health within poor countries and most childhood deaths 
occur in poor households.
3 In the sample period, almost one in ten children died in India before the age of one. Structural estimates on 
data from the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh indicate that for every neonatal death (which we analyze here), women 
have an additional 0.37 births (Bhalotra and van Soest 2008). Maternal mortality as a fraction of births is estimated 
at 0.5 percent (UNICEF).
4 At the turn of the century, fertility and infant mortality rates in America were similar to those in our estimation 
sample for India. In Britain in 2001, both were dramatically smaller. Even so, most women expect to engage with 
public health services at least once through pregnancy and this makes them heavier users, other conditions equal. 
The greater concern of women for public health in contemporary Britain may also reflect their representation of 
children and of the poor.
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seats results in a 2.1 percentage point (33.5 percent) reduction in neonatal mortal-
ity. A 10 percentage point increase in women’s representation is close to a shift 
from zero to one woman in the median district in our sample, which has nine seats. 
The estimated changes in neonatal mortality drive similarly large impacts on infant 
mortality. To put the effect size in perspective, note that the causal impact of democ-
ratization on infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-Cold War period is 
estimated to be a 1.2 percentage point drop in infant mortality, which is 12 percent 
of the sample mean (Kudamatsu 2012).
We find limited evidence of “elitism” amongst women elected to state legisla-
tures. For instance, the point estimates suggest larger impacts for low-caste chil-
dren and amongst children of families in the middle as compared with the top of 
the wealth distribution. There are no significant differences in the impact of women 
politicians who belong to lower vs higher castes. These results are topical given that a 
bill proposing quotas for women in state assemblies is currently pending in the Indian 
Parliament, with one of the axis of debate being that women elected to state assem-
blies are unlikely to represent the interests of the poor (Rai 2002; Section II below).
We show that a number of constituency and candidate characteristics are uncor-
related with the gender of the winner in the close election sample and the estimates 
stand up to a battery of checks including variation of the vote margin that identifies 
close elections and controls for party and a polynomial in the vote margin. They 
are robust to a rich set of controls for within-mother and district-level unobserv-
able trends, and to three falsifying tests. We report several extensions, looking at 
the impacts of decentralisation, political competition, turnout, media activity and 
party alignment. We find no evidence that devolutionary reforms in 1993, resulted 
in power being devolved to district and village councils, weakened the influence of 
women in state assemblies. The relative influence of women in state legislatures is 
greater when the chief minister is a woman. However, belonging to the same party 
as the chief minister does not enhance the influence of women legislators, which 
supports our identification of gender as distinct from party effects.5
We are able to identify mechanisms, and this underlines the plausibility of our 
findings. We find that women politicians are more likely to invest in the village level 
public health infrastructure while men appear more likely to invest in the financial 
(and telecommunications) infrastructure. Raising female political representation 
results in substantially improved probabilities of attending antenatal care, taking 
iron supplements during pregnancy, giving birth in a government facility as opposed 
to at home (note: we establish no change in the probability of giving birth in a pri-
vate facility), and early initiation of breastfeeding. By analyzing outcomes such as 
breastfeeding that are not dependent upon infrastructure, we argue that the evidence 
is also consistent with politician-led information campaigns. Our finding that the 
estimated impacts are larger for first-births also suggests a role for information as 
information obtained for a first birth tends to persist within mother.
Our results resonate with a literature which suggests that women exhibit a stron-
ger propensity to invest in children and have more progressive social preferences 
5 The point estimates indicate that turnout and newspaper circulation in the regional language enhance the policy 
influence of women while party competition tends to lower it but these estimates are imprecise.
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than men. Possibly our main contribution is to the literature describing persistence 
of an unnecessarily large global disease burden and, in this context, the failure of 
public health delivery. We propose reasons that women will tend to have stronger 
preferences over health provision than men and produce robust estimates of causal 
effects using several large representative samples of data from India. Our finding 
that incremental changes in women’s representation in state assemblies have size-
able impacts on health-related infrastructure, behavior and outcomes is of potential 
policy significance not only in relation to motivating political quotas but also insofar 
as it extends our understanding of how political improvements in public health may 
be achieved.
II. Women in Politics: Theoretical Background and Evidence
In the benchmark model of democracy, characterized by complete policy commit-
ment, policy choices reflect voter preferences and are independent of legislator iden-
tity (Downs 1957). However, more recent citizen candidate models admit a role for 
legislator preferences (Besley and Coate 1997; Levitt 1996; Osborne and Slivinski 
1996). This introduces the possibility that women politicians make different policy 
choices than men but this rests upon women having different preferences from men. 
In this way, this paper binds two streams of the literature, one concerned with politi-
cal identity and the other with differences in preferences between the sexes. We have 
identified public health as a domain over which we expect women have stronger 
preferences. Identifying the empirical relevance of preference differences and the 
domains in which they are most active is key to informing debates over quotas for 
women in government, debates which refer not only to representation but also to 
principles of fairness and diversity (Squires 1996), and which suffer from a scarcity 
of causal evidence of the impact of representation on policy outcomes.
Much of the recent evidence in economics on the influence of women in govern-
ment has emerged from India following a constitutional amendment which came into 
force in 1993, and after which the federal government devolved power to district and 
village level governments and introduced reservations for women at these levels. In 
particular, it was mandated that a third of the seats in every village council and, by 
random assignment, a third of the posts of head of village council be reserved for 
women. A recent crop of studies analyzes policy and process in village-level gov-
ernance after 1993, comparing villages in which council headship was reserved for 
women with villages in which it was not (Duflo and Chattopadhyay 2004; Beaman 
et al. 2007, 2009; Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan 2011; Iyer et al. 2011). Since 
every village had a third of its seats reserved for women after the amendment, these 
 post-1993 cross-village comparisons identify the impact of council headship rather 
than women’s representation.6
6 An exception is Iyer et al. (2012) who analyze the combined influence of reservation of headship and of a third 
of the seats of the village council for women. Rather than a cross-village comparison of local outcomes they study 
cross-state variation in the reporting of crimes against women as a function of variation in the year in which differ-
ent states implemented the 1993 village-level reform.
168 AmErIcAN EcoNomIc JoUrNAL: EcoNomIc PoLIcy mAy 2014
Our analysis of women’s representation in state legislative assemblies is moot 
given that a Women’s Reservation Bill proposing that a third of seats in state assem-
blies and parliament be reserved for women is currently under debate. The Bill was 
introduced in September 1996 and passed by the rajya Sabha (Upper House) in 
March 2010 but is currently pending in the Lok Sabha (Lower House). The intro-
duction of reservations for women in village councils in 1993 is regarded as a vic-
tory for India’s women’s movement as it allowed the grassroots involvement of 
village women in village-level development programs. The more limited support 
for the move to introduce reservations in state and national parliaments reflects, in 
part, a concern that women who claim those seats will tend to be elite and therefore 
unlikely to represent the interests of the majority of women citizens (Mishra 2000, 
Rai 2002). By studying child mortality, which is most prevalent among the poor, we 
effectively test the hypothesis that the policy choices of women in state assemblies 
are detached from the interests of the common woman.
We differ from most previous work in studying women politicians in state legisla-
tures rather than village councils, acting as members [of the state legislature] rather 
than as heads [of the village council] and elected against men rather than appointed 
to reserved seats.7 Women in India occupy a small share of state assembly seats and 
it is conceivable that incremental changes in their share will have limited policy 
influence even if their headship at the local level counts. In contrast to previous 
studies, we investigate not only the composition of village level public goods but, 
by studying health outcomes, we also study the effectiveness of state interventions. 
We analyze a longer period of India’s democratic history that includes pre-1993 
data. This allows us to test whether the devolutionary reforms in 1993, by sharing 
power with district and village councils, weakened the influence of women in state 
assemblies. This is the first paper to investigate whether women’s say varies with 
indicators of political competition, and with the gender and party similarity of the 
state chief minister. Alongside a range of indicators of public health, we investigate 
fertility and the sex of births as outcomes.
Two previous studies investigate the role of women in state legislatures. One 
concludes that raising the share of female politicians results in higher education 
but only in urban areas (Clots-Figueras 2012). The other finds improvements in a 
wider set of policy variables but shows that these improvements flow essentially 
from women who hold seats reserved for the lower castes, that is, from “nonelite” 
women politicians (Clots-Figueras 2011). However it looks at law, expenditure, and 
infrastructure aggregated to the state-level and it may be that the influence of higher 
caste women is apparent at a more disaggregate level, in the allocation of resources 
towards their constituencies. Alternatively, their influence may lie not in expenditure 
and infrastructure but in the effectiveness of provision arising, for example, from 
the conduct of information campaigns. We therefore look at effectiveness of politi-
cians at the local level and motivate a focus on public health provision as a domain 
7 While randomization of the headship of the village council in India created quasi-experimental data, a limita-
tion of generalizing results from analysis of reservations is that they can have direct effects on policy outcomes by 
changing the nature of political competition (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). We discuss identification of 
the influence of competitively elected leaders in Section IV.
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in which gendered preferences may be exhibited and also a domain in which the 
beneficiaries are relatively poor.
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Health outcomes and Facilities.—We avoid the use of state-level health expen-
diture given that its effectiveness in developing countries at large has been debated 
(Filmer and Pritchett 1999; Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000). Raising the share 
of women in US state legislatures has been shown to raise state health spending 
(Rehavi 2003) but, in India, a disproportionate share of the health budget is dedicated 
to (curative) hospital services which are less pro-poor than (preventive) public health 
expenditures (Peters et al. 2002). While Indian data suggest some impact of health 
expenditure on infant mortality, this impact is weakest in the most vulnerable groups 
(Bhalotra 2007). We select neonatal and infant mortality as indicators of public health 
provision that measure the effectiveness of state intervention, and at a local level, 
namely, the district from which the politician is elected. To investigate what it is that 
women politicians actually do, we investigate the influence of politician gender on 
the village level public health infrastructure. However public health facilities in India 
are often poorly staffed (Das and Hammer 2007; Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo 2003) 
and uptake of publicly provided services such as immunization low (Banerjee et al. 
2010). So we also investigate a range of indicators of the utilization of publicly pro-
vided antenatal and early postnatal care to indicate whether politician gender influ-
ences health-seeking behavior. There is a sharp wealth gradient in all of the outcomes.
Health Data.—Individual data on child survival are obtained from retrospective 
fertility histories reported in the second round of the Indian National Family Health 
Survey (NFHS) by a representative sample of ever-married women aged 15–49 in 
1998–1999.8 This makes it straightforward to identify siblings. There is an average 
of 3.8 births per mother, conditional on at least two. The histories provide informa-
tion on the year of birth and death for births that occur across three decades, so these 
data can be matched to the time variation in the political data. The data indicate the 
district of current residence and the years that the mother has lived in her current 
location. We drop mothers who had births in a location other than the current resi-
dence, but we investigate this restriction below. To allow for full exposure to neona-
tal [infant] morality risk we exclude children born less than a month [a year] before 
the date of the survey. We also draw from the NFHS information on health-seeking 
behaviors in the four years preceding the survey date and on village facilities at the 
time of the survey. These are defined in the Data Appendix and discussed further 
in the results section. The state of public health is very poor. For instance, in our 
sample period, 10 percent of children die before the age of one, almost 70 percent 
of births occur at home and only 14 percent of villages have a primary health center. 
All descriptive statistics are in Tables 1A, 1B, and 1C.
8 For further information, including sampling design, see International Institute for Population Sciences and 
ORC Macro (2000). For a discussion of the potential issues arising with the use of retrospective data, see the Data 
Appendix.
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Political Structure.—India is the largest and oldest democracy in the developing 
world. It has a federal structure in which the constitution devolves significant control 
over their own government to the 28 states and 7 union territories, and population 
health falls under the purview of State Legislative Assemblies. States and union ter-
ritories are divided into single-member constituencies in which candidates are elected 
in first-past-the-post elections. The boundaries of assembly constituencies are drawn 
to make sure that there are, as near as practicable, the same number of inhabitants 
in each constituency. Thus, state assemblies vary in size with the state population. 
Districts are an important level of local government between state and village govern-
ments. Most decisions pertaining to public health provision were made at the state 
level until 1993 (Rao and Singh 1998). Even after 1993, when powers over the imple-
mentation of developmental projects were devolved to the district and village level, 
state legislators continued to have substantial say and to play a potentially important 
role in negotiation with and coordination across layers of local government.
Electoral Data.—We have constituency-level data on the gender and votes won 
by the winner and runner-up for every election to State Legislatures in India dur-
ing 1967–1998. Our sample contains information on 76,732 constituency elec-
tions in the 16 larger states. In order to match these data with health data, they are 
 aggregated to the district level (see the Data Appendix). Districts have between 1 
and 37 electoral constituencies and the median district has 9. Elections are routinely 
Table 1A—Descriptives
  Mean SD
Unit of observation: Individual (child), cohorts 1968–1999 in 246 districts
Neonatal mortality 0.0627 0.2423
Infant mortality 0.0980 0.2973
Birth order 2.7561 1.8099
Multiple birth 0.0138 0.1166
Girl 0.4770 0.4995
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.1959 0.3969
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 0.1080 0.3104
Muslim 0.1070 0.3092
Christian 0.0113 0.1057
Other religion 0.0332 0.1791
Rural 0.7816 0.4131
Age of the mother at birth 22.7412 5.0420
Observations 75,339  
Unit of observation: Individual (child) in the four years before the survey date (1998–1999)
Number of antenatal visits 2.3190 2.4403
Delivery at home 0.6920 0.4617
Delivery in a government institution 0.1618 0.3683
Delivery in a private institution 0.1462 0.3533
Breastfed in the first 24 hours 0.4816 0.4997
Took iron and folic acid supplements during pregnancy 0.5714 0.4949
Received a tetanus injection during pregnancy 0.7361 0.4408
Observations 8,853  
Notes: National Family Health Survey, Round 2 (1998-2000), summary statistics for estimation samples. The sam-
ple used to estimate childhood mortality outcomes consists of 75,339 children born in 1968–1999 across 246 dis-
tricts. The sample used to estimate health-seeking behaviors consists of 8,853 children born in the four years before 
the survey date. “SD” is standard deviation.
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Table 1B—Descriptives
  Mean SD
Unit of observation: District in an electoral year, elections between 1967–1998 in 246 districts
Proportion of seats won by women (women) 0.0364 0.0740
Proportion of districts that had at least one woman politician 0.2640 0.4409
Proportion of seats that had close elections between women and men, close:
 3.5 percent margin (totalclose)
0.0084 0.0333
Proportion of districts that had at least one election between a woman and a man 0.4025 0.4905
Proportion of districts that had at least one close election between a woman and
 a man (3.5 percent)
0.0745 0.2626
Proportion of seats won by women in close elections against men (3.5 percent)
 (womenclose)
0.0041 0.0227
Proportion of districts that had at least one woman politician who won in a close
 election against a man (3.5 percent)
0.0383 0.1921
Dummy for the first election between a woman and a man ( I j )* 0.4025 0.4905
Dummy for the second election between a woman and a man 0.1292 0.3356
Dummy for the third election between a woman and a man 0.0389 0.1934
Dummy for the fourth election between a woman and a man 0.0071 0.0841
Dummy for the fifth election between a woman and a man 0.0044 0.0661
Dummy for the sixth election between a woman and a man 0.0011 0.0331
Vote margin for the first election between a woman and a man ( m j )** 0.0142 0.1820
Vote margin for the second election between a woman and a man 0.0307 0.2499
Vote margin for the third election between a woman and a man 0.0024 0.3002
Vote margin for the fourth election between a woman and a man 0.0115 0.3105
Vote margin for the fifth election between a woman and a man −0.0241 0.3827
Vote margin for the sixth election between a woman and a man 0.0092 0.4649
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST candidates 0.2366 0.1785
Proportion of seats won by Congress parties 0.4519 0.3317
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left parties 0.0589 0.1512
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left parties 0.0231 0.0901
Proportion of seats won by Janata parties 0.1661 0.2727
Proportion of seats won by Hindu parties 0.1280 0.2290
Proportion of seats won by Regional parties 0.0772 0.2027
Female literacy rate 0.2844 0.1720
Male literacy rate 0.5352 0.1559
Proportion of SC/STs 0.2524 0.1344
Proportion of urban population 0.2041 0.1409
Proportion of female population 0.4811 0.0167
Women belonging to the same party of the chief minister 0.0146 0.0505
Women belonging to other parties 0.0218 0.0570
Political Competition Index (Besley and Burgess 2002) −0.4446 0.2105
Turnout rate 59.1858 9.5442
Female turnout rate 53.6500 11.5700
Female to male turnout ratio 0.8387 0.0876
Newspaper circulation (Besley and Burgess 2002) 0.0599 0.0400
Newspaper circulation (Besley and Burgess 2002) English 0.0085 0.0141
Newspaper circulation (Besley and Burgess 2002) Hindi 0.0234 0.0251
Newspaper circulation (Besley and Burgess 2002) Regional languages 0.0519 0.0342
Whether state chief minister is a woman 0.0356 0.1353
Observations 1,826  
Notes: Electoral data from the Election Commission of India was obtained at the constituency level and aggregated 
to the district level. Summary statistics for the estimation sample. Individual health outcomes are matched to poli-
tician gender in their district of birth in the year before their birth, hence the one year difference in the year range 
between the health and electoral sample.
  * The first, second, etc. elections refer to the number of constituencies within a district that have a man-woman 
election. So 40 percent of districts have at least one constituency (seat) that was won in a man-woman election, 
13 percent of districts have at least two, and so on.
 ** The vote margins are ordered by absolute value in districts with more than one election and now first, second, 
etc. margin refer to the first, second, etc. constituency.
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every five years but states often hold mid-term elections at shorter intervals. The 
mean proportion of seats in a district won by women is 3.6 percent (SD 7.4 percent). 
The median is zero and the seventy-fifth and ninetieth percentiles are, respectively, 
5.5 and 14.3 percent. So the distribution is highly skewed (Figure A1 in the online 
Appendix). At least one woman was elected in 26.4 percent of district-electoral 
years and in this subsample, the share of seats held by women is 13.8 percent. There 
is an upward trend in the share of seats held by women (Figure 1) and substantial 
differences in both the level and trend by state (Figure 2).
We define close elections as elections in which the winner and the runner-up 
are of opposite gender and the vote margin between them is less than 3.5 percent. 
Across the sample period, only 7.45 percent of district-years had at least one close 
election, but they have become more common over time. Fewer than 1 in 400 seats 
had close elections between women and men in the 1960s and 1970s, and that figure 
jumped to more than 1 in 100 for the 1980s and 1990s.
merged Data.—The health data are merged with the political data by district 
and (lagged) birth year to produce a micro panel of births within mother nested 
within a district-year panel. The estimation sample contains more than 70,000 indi-
vidual births to some 18,000 mothers that occur across 246 districts (in 16 states) 
over the 32-year period, 1967–1998.9 A nonparametric (lowess) plot of the relation-
ship between neonatal mortality risk and the share of women leaders at the district 
level shows that the unconditional relationship is negative (Figure A2 in the online 
Appendix). We now investigate whether a negative relationship persists after allow-
ing for endogeneity and heterogeneity.
9 The number of election years is 26 and, since different states had elections in different years, the estimation 
sample contains 1,826 district-year cells.
Table 1C—Descriptives
Unit of observation: Village Mean SD
Primary health subcenter 0.3517 0.4777
Primary health center 0.1418 0.3490
Community health center 0.0815 0.2737
Government dispensary 0.1252 0.3310
Government hospital 0.0353 0.1846
Electricity 2.1797 0.6976
Post office 0.3755 0.4844
Telegraph 0.2015 0.4013
STD (telephone) booth 0.1958 0.3969
Bank 0.2831 0.4506
Observations 1,558  
Notes: Data from the village file of the National Family Health Survey, 1988–1999, containing information on 
facilities at the time of the survey. Summary statistics for the estimation sample for the infrastructure equations.
VoL. 6 No. 2 173bhalotra and clots-figueras: health and women politicians
IV. Empirical Strategy
We are interested in the relationship between an individual’s access to public 
health services and the share of women elected to state assemblies from the individ-
ual’s district of birth. We focus upon antenatal and early postnatal services  targeted 
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at women and newborns, and hence at the gender mix of politicians in the year 
before and the year of birth. In this section, we explain how we address the three 
potential sources of bias that arise. First, women’s representation tends to be cor-
related with voter preferences. Second, the composition of births may vary endog-
enously. Third, there may be district-year varying changes in other determinants of 
health that coincide with the election of women.
To address the problem that common unobservables may drive both electoral 
preferences for women and health-related behaviors we instrument the overall share 
of women politicians with the share of women who win in close elections against 
men. Close elections are defined as those in which the winner and the runner up are 
of opposite gender and the margin of victory is small. The premise is that the iden-
tity (gender) of the winner of a close election is quasi-random. To see this, note that 
in a first-past-the-post electoral system, the probability of being elected is a function 
of the vote difference between the winner and the runner-up and this function has a 
discontinuity at zero. As the vote difference approaches the discontinuity, constitu-
encies in which a woman wins by a small vote margin are increasingly similar to 
constituencies in which a man wins by a small margin (Lee 2001; Pettersson-Lidbom 
2001). Since we aggregate to the district level over discontinuities at the constitu-
ency level, our specification is similar to a fuzzy regression discontinuity design 
(e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2008, 259). We investigate robustness of the  estimates to 
controls for varying polynomials in the constituency-specific margins of victory or 
defeat of each man-woman close election in the district.
The identification driving our approach is nicely illustrated in Figure 3, which 
plots the fraction of seats (constituencies) in the district won by female politicians 
against the margin of victory between the female and the male candidate (a positive 
margin means that the woman won). Figure 3, panel A uses all the elections between 
a male and a female politician, while Figure 3, panel B restricts the sample to those 
districts that had a single election between a male and a female politician. The data 
are aggregated into one percentage point bins, as suggested by Imbens and Lemieux 
(2008), and we plot a lowess smoothing line on each side of the discontinuity. The 
size of the jump in Figure 3, panel A indicates that a woman winning a close elec-
tion in a district increases the fraction of constituencies in the district won by female 
politicians by roughly 10 percentage points. This is what we would expect given that 
the average district has 9–10 constituencies.
Although the gender of the winner in a close election may be considered random, 
the existence of close elections between women and men may not, for example, it 
may depend on the number of female candidates in the district and this, in turn, may 
be correlated with voter preferences. To allow for this, we control for the fraction of 
seats in the district that had close elections between female and male candidates in 
the first and second stage of the instrumental variables procedure. Close elections 
between women and men have been previously used for identification by Rehavi 
(2003) and Clots-Figueras (2011, 2012). We investigate the assumptions underlying 
the use of close elections in Section VB, where we also assess the external validity 
of our estimates.
Since we focus upon newborns, we need to address a further potential source 
of bias arising from endogenous heterogeneity in the timing of fertility: through 
VoL. 6 No. 2 175bhalotra and clots-figueras: health and women politicians
 selection into either conception or fetal survival, the composition of live births in the 
sample may vary systematically with the gender composition of politicians.10 For 
instance, some women may be more likely than others to consciously advance or 
10 See Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) and Bhalotra (2010) who argue that selection may arise from the con-
scious timing of fertility and the selective survival of the fetus respectively.
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Figure 3. First Stage Illustration
Note: We plot the fraction of seats won by female politicians against the margin of victory in elections between 
women and men. Figure 3, panel A uses all the elections between a male and a female politician, while Figure 3, 
panel B restricts the sample to those districts that had a single election between a male and a female politician.
176 AmErIcAN EcoNomIc JoUrNAL: EcoNomIc PoLIcy mAy 2014
defer fertility in response to the policy [political] regime. Alternatively, fetal death 
(whether through miscarriage or (female) feticide), may vary systematically as a 
function of reproductive health facilities and campaigns discouraging feticide and 
these facilities and campaigns may in turn be influenced by the share of women poli-
ticians. If, for instance, the incidence of female feticide declines under women politi-
cians then, given that feticide is more common amongst educated mothers (Bhalotra 
and Cochrane 2010), the composition of (live) births that we observe under women 
politicians will tend to be lower risk than the sample observed under male politi-
cians. If we do not control for this, we may attribute what is essentially a selection 
effect to differences in the behavior of female versus male politicians. We limit 
this problem by using mother fixed effects. These will purge all fixed  mother-level 
unobservables including the time-invariant component of their political preferences 
and any tendency they may have to compensate or reinforce state investments in 
children (crowding out or crowding in). This is a considerable improvement relative 
to using district fixed effects.
The third potential bias is addressed by controlling for unobservable trends. In 
the specification illustrated below, we control for state-specific trends but in exten-
sions of this we demonstrate robustness to district-specific trends and district by 
mother-cohort fixed effects. The first set of estimated models is
(1) mortalityimdt = αm + θt + β womendt−1 +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  ∂ 1j  I jdt × F( m jdt ) +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  ∂ 2j  I jdt 
 + λtotalclosedt−1 + Ximdt  ζ + ⋯ + Zdt  μ + φs t + εimdt
(2) womendt = χm + ωt + τ womenclosedt +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  ∂ 3j  I jdt × F( m jdt ) 
 +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  ∂ 4  I jdt + ψ totalclosedt + ⋯ + Ximdt ρ + Zdt π + υst + eimdt .
The subscripts denote the individual child i of mother m born in district d (in state s) 
in year t. By construction, mothers do not migrate across districts between births 
(we investigate this restriction in Section VB). Hence mother fixed effects nest (or 
imply) district fixed effects. mortality is an indicator for the index child dying by 
the age of one month (neonatal), women is the district-level share of state assembly 
constituencies to which a woman was elected in the year before the child was born 
(we investigate timing below) and β is the parameter of interest. The other variables 
in equation (1), in order, are mother and (child) cohort fixed effects, a third-order 
polynomial (F ) in the victory margin (m) between the winner and the runner up for 
every (close or nonclose) man-woman election j, interacted with Ijdt , an indicator for 
whether such an election exists, totalclose is the fraction of constituencies in the dis-
trict that experienced a close election, X is a vector of child or mother-specific con-
trols, Z is a vector of district-year varying controls and φ are state-specific trends. We 
examine sensitivity to the definition of close elections, inclusion of victory margins, 
district trends, flexible trends in mother’s age and cohort, and individual controls. 
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Equation (2) represents the first stage of the IV procedure. It shows the potentially 
endogenous regressor, women, regressed upon the instrument, womenclose, and the 
same set of controls. The instrument is the fraction of constituencies in the district 
in which a woman won against a man in a close election.
The cohort dummies control for aggregate time variation associated with, for 
example, secular improvements in health technology, episodic shocks like famines, 
floods and epidemics and any aggregate economic or political regime changes. 
The state (and, later, district) specific trends allow for regional omitted trends, for 
 example, income or trends in the status of women. The district level controls Z 
include the shares of the population that are female, urban, and low caste as well 
as male and female literacy rates. Controls X include dummies for the gender, birth 
order, rural/urban location, religion, and caste of the child and an indicator for 
whether the child is one of a multiple birth.
We use a linear model since fixed effects probit estimates are inconsistent in short 
panels (Nickell 1981) and the relevant panel in this case is the micro-panel, where 
T is the number of children per mother. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms 
of heteroskedasticity and clustered at the district-level since the regressor of inter-
est, women, is entered as a district-level share. This allows for correlations at any 
time and across time within district (e.g., Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). 
It also allows for correlation of the standard errors across siblings because, by con-
struction, siblings are all in the same district.
In sum, the estimated specification delivers an estimate of the difference in mortal-
ity risk across children of the same mother born at different times and under different 
political regimes, with the change in political regime constructed as a  quasi-random 
assignment of the gender of politicians in the district of birth. We investigate the 
identifying assumptions that underlie the use of close elections. In view of our use 
of mother fixed effects, we check on the further identifying assumption that there 
are no omitted mother-specific trends the effects of which may load onto the vari-
able of interest. We conduct a range of sensitivity checks including three sorts of 
falsification exercises and investigate heterogeneity in impact by characteristics of 
the child/mother and political variables including competition and decentralization.
We further estimate equations that replace mortality in equation (1) with a vector 
of village public goods on the one hand and a vector of individual antenatal and early 
postnatal health-seeking behaviors on the other. We investigate fertility and the sex 
of births as further outcomes. The identification strategies we use to analyze these 
investments and behaviors are similar and are detailed below, alongside the results.
V. Results
A. Survival outcomes
Estimates of equations (1) and (2) are in Table 2. Consider effect sizes in the 
richest specification, which appears in column 6. Raising the share of seats held by 
women at the district level (women) by one standard deviation (0.0740) is estimated 
to result in declines in neonatal [infant] mortality of 1.5 [1.4] percentage points. This 
is 24 [14] percent of the mean rate in the sample, which is 6.3[9.8] percent and it 
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Table 2—Baseline Results
  OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Neonatal mortality
Fraction of seats in district won −0.0050 −0.0148 −0.0303 −0.1176 −0.1942** −0.2061***
 by female politicians (women) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.074) (0.079) (0.078)
District FE x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x
Mother FE x x x
Controls x
Vote margins 3rd order 3rd order 3rd order
polynomial polynomial polynomial
Observations 95,016 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498
Number of mothers         18,754 18,754
First-stage regressions. Dependent variable: Fraction of seats in the district won by female politicians
        (1) (2) (3)
Fraction of seats in district won by 0.8939*** 0.9011*** 0.8964***
 female politicians in close
 elections against male politicians
 (womenclose)
(0.0714) (0.0785) (0.0789)
Fraction of seats in district that had −0.4303*** −0.4514*** −0.4495***
 close elections between female
 and male candidates (totalclose) (0.0528) (0.0559) (0.0559)
F first stage 156.27 131.6 129.1
  OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B. Infant mortality
Fraction of seats in district won 0.0081 0.0029 −0.0143 −0.0540 −0.1645 −0.1916*
 by female politicians (women) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.098) (0.107) (0.104)
District FE x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x
Mother FE x x x
Controls x
Vote margins 3rd order 3rd order 3rd order
polynomial polynomial polynomial
Observations 91,169 68,665 68,665 68,665 68,665 68,665
Number of mothers         18,003 18,003
First-stage regressions. Dependent variable: Fraction of seats in the district won by female politicians
        (1) (2) (3)
Fraction of seats in district won by 0.9202*** 0.9302*** 0.9255***
 female politicians in close
 elections against male politicians
 (womenclose)
(0.0671) (0.0744) (0.0752)
Fraction of seats in district that had −0.4575*** −0.4818*** −0.4797***
 close elections between female
 and male candidates (totalclose) (0.0507) (0.0537) (0.0540)
F first stage 187.6 156.3 151.3
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. The first columns (1 
and 2) show estimates with the full sample, while subsequent columns show estimates for mothers with at least two 
births. Close elections are defined as elections in which the winner won against the runner up by less than 3.5 per-
cent of votes. All regressions include district and cohort fixed effects (FE); the third and fourth columns replace 
district FE with mother FE. Note that mother FE include or imply district FE since mothers do not migrate across 
districts between births (by construction: this is investigated in Section VB). All equations include state specific 
linear trends, district specific trends are included in Table 3. Controls at the district level include the fraction of the 
district population that is female, urban and SC/ST, and male and female literacy rates. Controls at the individual 
level include dummy variables for gender, caste, religion, birth order, rural/urban location and for whether the birth 
is one of a multiple birth. All regressions shown also include as a control the fraction of constituencies in the district 
that had close elections between women and men (totalclose).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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corresponds to a 0.063 [0.048] change in the SD of neonatal [infant] mortality. Since 
the distribution of women is skewed (Figure A1 in the online Appendix), we con-
sider the survival improvements brought about by electing one additional woman. 
The median district has nine constituencies and so nine seats. As it happens, close to 
10 percent of districts in the sample have exactly nine seats and in this set the mean 
(0.034) and median (0) share of seats held by women is very similar to the sample 
mean (0.036) and median (0). If one additional woman wins, the median number of 
seats goes from 0 to 1 and the share from 0 to 1/9 = 0.11. If we plug this in to the 
estimated equations, we get even larger numbers. The predicted decline in neonatal 
[infant] mortality is now 2.3 [2.1] percentage points. Later we show that the effects 
of politician gender on infant mortality are entirely determined by its effects on 
neonatal mortality (Section VC).
Table 2 describes how the estimates for neonatal mortality evolve as the spec-
ification is enriched to improve identification. The OLS coefficient is small and 
insignificant. There is no significant change in it when the sample is restricted to 
mothers with at least two births in column 2, the sample that will be used in the final 
specification. Controlling for mother fixed effects in the OLS specification results 
in a larger negative coefficient but it remains poorly determined. The 2SLS coeffi-
cients are larger and, conditional upon mother fixed effects, statistically significant. 
The IV-fixed effects coefficient is not significantly different from the IV coefficient 
(column 4 versus column 5). Introducing the household and district level controls 
listed in notes to Table 2 makes no significant difference although the coefficient is 
slightly larger.11
The OLS coefficient may be biased by the endogeneity of voter preferences. Our 
finding that it is biased downwards is consistent with women being more likely to 
be elected in districts with poorer baseline health. The inclusion of mother and, 
implicitly, district fixed effects implies that results will not reflect fixed differences 
between districts, but it may be that female politicians are elected in districts with 
declining trends in health. The difference between the IV and OLS coefficients may 
also reflect a difference between the local average identified off close races and the 
average effect. How the local and the average impacts compare depends upon the 
underlying theoretical model, and our findings appear consistent with a citizen can-
didate model. If the cost of a close race is higher than of a nonclose race then a can-
didate needs a higher payoff to play, suggesting that only candidates with far apart 
preferences will play (Rehavi 2003). Another possibility is that women who run in 
close races against men are positively selected on characteristics, having overcome 
greater social barriers to compete on a male-dominated terrain.
In general, IV coefficients will be larger when the variable of interest is measured 
with error but we expect that measurement error in counting women winners in 
Indian elections is small. Indeed, if measurement error were important then, as this 
is exacerbated by differencing, we would expect attenuation of the coefficient upon 
 introduction of mother fixed effects. Instead the coefficient is larger still, possibly 
11 Table 2 reports only the coefficient on the regressor of interest. Online Appendix Table A6 reports the full set 
of coefficients. Given that the effect we find for infant mortality is mainly capturing the effect on neonatal mortality, 
the extensions below will be for neonatal mortality. Parallel results for infant mortality are available on request.
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indicating that parents reinforce endowments in allocations across siblings, consistent 
with other evidence that points in this same direction (Almond and Mazumder 2013).
The first stage of the 2SLS estimates is also reported in Table 2. The instrument 
is powerful and the share of women who win across all elections varies propor-
tionately with the share of women who win in close elections.12 With the share of 
women winners in close elections constant, the share of all women winners is nega-
tively associated with the total share of close elections within a district since this 
now varies only with the share of male winners. The coefficient in the reduced form 
of the equation system (1), (2) is −0.1847 with a standard error of 0.070.
B. robustness checks
We first outline checks on the close-elections assumption (online Appendix 
Tables A1–A5) and then discuss robustness of the baseline specification to specifi-
cation checks (Table 3; online Appendix Tables A7–A9).
The close-Elections Assumption.—Following the initial use of the close elec-
tion identification strategy in the context of close elections between Democrats and 
Republicans in the United States (Lee 2001), concerns have been raised that the 
outcomes of close elections may be biased in favor of incumbents or in favor of 
candidates from parties that have strategic control over the election process (Snyder 
2005; Caughey and Sekhon 2011; Grimmer et al. 2011). We investigate incumbency 
and party affiliation in addition to other observables but find no evidence of this 
problem for our sample of close elections between men and women in India. A sim-
ple regression shows that the proportion of women in a district who won in a close 
election against a man is independent of the history of close elections in the district, 
the history of women being elected, the share of seats that each of eight parties con-
tested in close elections and a host of district-time varying demographic variables 
(Table A1 in the online Appendix). Candidate and constituency characteristics are 
also independent of the gender of the winner in close elections. This includes the 
number of other female candidates in the constituency, whether the winner was the 
incumbent, the number of close elections in the past, the votes received by the win-
ner and turnout (Table A2 in the online Appendix). These results are consistent with 
the gender of the winner in close elections between men and women being random.
Our estimates rely upon districts that had at least one close election between a 
woman and a man and the share of all births in the sample that occur in these districts 
is 7.45 percent. In Tables A3 and A4 in the online Appendix, we investigate whether 
districts that had a close election are matched on observables to districts that did not. 
The observables include district demographics, the share of villages with hospitals 
and schools, and the share of seats won by each gender in elections that were not 
close (online Appendix Table A3). The mean differences are small but some are 
significantly different from zero, which underlines the importance of our  controlling 
12 The coefficient on the fraction of constituencies won by women in close elections against men in panel A 
is 0.89, which is not significantly different from 1. But some female politicians win in elections that are not close 
elections against men, some win against a man by a large margin, and others may win against another woman.
VoL. 6 No. 2 181bhalotra and clots-figueras: health and women politicians
for the fraction of seats in the district that had close elections between women and 
men. The share of constituencies won by each of the main political parties in India 
is not significantly different between close and nonclose elections (online Appendix 
Table A4). We nevertheless control in the regressions for the district-level seat shares 
of each of seven parties for the reason stated in the next section.
Electoral Variables.—Since regression discontinuity underlies the close election 
IV approach, we investigate parameterization of the vote margin between the win-
ner and runner up. The coefficient of interest is not significantly altered by dropping 
these controls or restricting the order of the polynomial (Table 3, columns 1–3). The 
premise that the gender of the leader is random in a close election only holds in a 
small window around the point where the vote margin between the winner and the 
runner up is zero, but there is an efficiency-robustness trade-off in deciding the width 
of the window. We therefore investigate the chosen threshold for identification of 
close elections, varying this downwards and upwards from the selected 3.5 percent 
Table 3—Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Neonatal mortality
Fraction of seats in −0.1473** −0.1902*** −0.1984*** −0.1969** −0.2616*** −0.2611*** −0.1422** −0.2289**
 in district won by
 female politicians
(0.070) (0.073) (0.073) (0.091) (0.088) (0.077) (0.072) (0.091)
Cohort FE x x x x x x x x
Mother FE x x x x x x x x
Controls x x x x x x x x
Margins no 
polynomial
1st order 
polynomial
2nd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
robustness checks victory 
margin
victory 
margin
victory 
margin
2% 2.50% 3% 4% at least
one w-m ele
Observations 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 29,979
Number of mothers 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754  9,989
Panel B. Neonatal mortality 
Fraction of seats in −0.1956** −0.2212** −0.2091*** −0.1886** −0.2001*** −0.2079** −0.1658** −0.1670**
 district won by
 female politicians
(0.078) (0.086) (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.082) (0.082) (0.080)
Cohort FE x x x x x x x x
Mother FE x x x x x x x
Controls x x x x x x x x
Margins 3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
3rd order 
polynomial
robustness checks political
controls
outliers age mother 
FE
mother 
cohort ×
child birth 
yr FE
quad trends state × birth 
year
FE
district 
trends
district ×
mother 
cohort FE
Observations 71,498 70,581 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498
Number of mothers 18,754 18,591 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754  
Notes: See notes to Table 2. Here we show robustness checks on the specification in column 6 of Table 2. 
Columns 1–3 in panel A vary the functional form for the constituency-level victory margins, columns 4–7 vary 
the definition of close elections upwards and downwards from the baseline definition of a (constituency-level) vote 
margin that is less than 3.5 percent. Column 8 estimates the model on the sub-sample of districts that had at least 
one election between a woman and a man. Column 1 in panel B includes controls for the share of votes won by each 
of seven political parties (see the Data Appendix) and the share of seats reserved for the low caste (SC/ST) popu-
lation. Column 2 removes outliers in women (see the text). Columns 3 and 4 include increasingly flexible controls 
for mother’s age at birth. Column 5 replaces linear with quadratic state trends, column 6 with state × year dummies 
and column 7 adds district-specific cohort trends. Column 8 adds district-mother’s birth year fixed effects.
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to include the range 2 to 4 percent. There is no significant change in the coefficient 
on women (columns 4 –7). We restricted the sample to district-year observations 
(41 percent of the baseline sample) in which there was at least one election between 
a man and a woman as these are the observations upon which identification rests. 
This makes no significant difference (column 8).13
To control for the possibility that certain political parties strategically appoint 
women candidates more than others (Rai 2002), we condition upon the dis-
trict share of seats occupied by each of seven parties.14 We also control for the 
district share of state assembly seats reserved for low-caste candidates to allow 
for the possibility that women and men compete differently for these seats. These 
changes do not alter the coefficient of interest (Table 3, panel B, column 1). Using 
the outer fence of the interquartile range, we removed outliers in women’s represen-
tation above the seventy-fifth percentile. This amounts to removing the 1.45 percent 
of observations with women greater than 28 percent. The estimates are robust to this 
(Table 3, panel B, column 2).
Within-mother Trends.—In a model with mother fixed effects, identification 
of calendar time effects can only come from mothers having children at different 
moments in time, and there is necessarily a trend in birth order and the mother’s 
age at birth between siblings. This makes it important to isolate the effects of 
time-variation in women’s political representation from the effects of birth-order and 
the age of the mother at each birth. We already control flexibly for birth order, using 
dummies for each order. We now introduce age at birth dummies and more flexible 
controls for mother’s age at birth, namely, dummies for mother’s cohort × child 
cohort (Table 3, columns 3-4, panel B). For a given year of birth of the mother, the 
year of birth of the child implies the age of the mother at birth. Since the estimated 
equations already include fixed effects for the child’s birth year, this is equivalent 
to controlling for fixed effects in the age of the mother at birth and allowing their 
impact to vary by the birth cohort of the mother. Controls for mother’s age at birth 
are also important in correcting for the fact that retrospective fertility (and mortal-
ity) data grow increasingly unrepresentative of mother’s age as we go further back 
in time (Rindfuss, Palmore, and Bumpass 1982). See the Data Appendix.
other Unobserved Trends.—We investigated controls for unobservable trends 
in general. The estimates in Table 2 are conditional upon state linear trends. We 
now include, in sequence, state-specific quadratic trends, state × year dummies, 
district-specific trends, and district × mother’s cohort dummies (columns 5–8, 
panel B of Table 3). The last is important because a potential problem with using 
only district fixed effects is that different cohorts of mothers in different districts, 
having been exposed to different income and health conditions, are more or less 
13 In principle we could implement a sharp regression discontinuity using districts in which there was exactly 
one election between a man and a woman but in practice we do not have enough within-mother variation in this.
14 Following Besley and Burgess (2002), seven party groups are constructed: Congress, Hard Left, Soft Left, 
Janata, Hindu, Regional parties, and Independents coupled with other small parties (these are the parties in A4 
where Independent and other are separated; also see the Data Appendix).
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likely to have children with lower survival chances.15 Again, as we condition upon 
fixed effects for the child’s birth year, this effectively allows for district-varying 
trends in the age of the mother at birth. The estimates are robust to these fairly pow-
erful controls.
Lags.—Since interventions motivated by politicians may operate with a lag, 
we investigated lags as far back as the third year before birth; see Table 4. Some 
 persistence is built in by virtue of politicians typically holding office for five years, 
as then politicians elected two years before a child is born will on average be in 
power the year before and the year the child is born.16 We find that the gender 
composition of politicians in the two years before birth and in the birth year (t − 2, 
t − 1, t) has a similar sized significant coefficient but the share of women in power 
more than two years before the index birth has no impact. In India most women have 
a birth within two years of marriage, so this particular pattern of fading is consistent 
with politicians targeting women at risk of conception (newly married women) with 
interventions such as prenatal care information, immunization or nutrition and this 
showing an impact on offspring born one or two years later.
Placebos.—To further mitigate concerns that we are capturing omitted trends, 
we implemented placebos. First, we modeled the neonatal mortality risk of cohorts 
born in t as a function of future politician gender (t + 1 to t + 9); these coeffi-
cients are all essentially zero (Table 4). Second, we used the sample of mothers that 
moved to the current location a year or more after the birth of their youngest child 
so their births are effectively matched to politicians that they were never exposed 
to. Again, the coefficient on women is small and insignificant (online Appendix 
15 See Bhalotra (2010) on the importance of mother’s birth year conditions for offspring health and see 
Kudamatsu (2012) for a related discussion in the context of mother fixed effects estimation of the impact of democ-
ratization on mortality.
16 Politicians in power at t − 5 will tend to exit before or in the birth year t, politicians in power in t − 4 will 
tend to exit before or in t + 1, and so on.
Table 4—Timing of the Effects and Falsification Exercise
Neonatal mortality     Neonatal mortality
Child’s age when
politician was in power Coefficient SE
Child’s age when 
politician was in power Coefficient SE
coefficient: Fraction of seats in the district won by female politicians 
−3 −0.0983 0.0900   4 −0.0114 0.0760
−2 −0.2257** 0.0990   5 0.0676 0.0700
−1 −0.2061*** 0.0780   6 0.0247 0.0860
0 −0.1975** 0.0840   7 0.0200 0.0860
1 −0.0417 0.0830   8 0.0410 0.0950
2 −0.0338 0.0820   9 −0.0801 0.0940
3 −0.0121 0.0810        
Notes: See notes to Table 2. The baseline specification in column 6 of Table 2 uses the first lag (−1) of the gen-
der mix of politicians at the district level because neonatal mortality is largely determined by the fetal environment 
and birth conditions. That equation is re-estimated here without a lag to investigate the existence of contempora-
neous effects and with two additional lags. We also investigate leads (1 to 9) of politician gender as a placebo (see 
the text).
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Table A8, column 1). However, there is a problem with this test which is that we 
do not know whether the previous location was in the same district or in a differ-
ent one, and this adds noise to the estimates. A third placebo was run using as an 
outcome, the height of mothers. Since adult height is largely determined in early 
childhood (Bozzoli, Deaton, and Quintana-Domeque 2009), we expect politicians 
in the birth year of the child to have no impact on the height of the mother, and this 
is what we see (Table A9 in the online Appendix).
migration.—The estimates in Table 2 are on the sample of mothers that have had 
all their births in their current place of residence. This is a strong restriction. We 
relax it to include only children who were born in the current place of residence of 
the mother. In order to investigate the extent of any selectivity in migration, we also 
estimate the model with no restrictions. The coefficient of interest grows smaller as 
we successively lift restrictions on the sample but it remains significant and within 
two standard errors of the baseline coefficient (Table A8 in the online Appendix).17 
This puts aside any concern that our selection of a nonmigrant mother sample is 
either creating a bias or producing results that may be altogether unrepresentative.
C. Extensions
The results discussed here are displayed in Tables 5 and 6.
Birth order.—If one of the ways that women politicians influence health out-
comes is through information campaigns then we may expect exposure to women 
politicians to have a larger impact on outcomes for first births. This is what we find 
(Table 5, columns 1–2, panel A). Aizer and Currie (2004) adduce a similar distinc-
tion between first and higher order births in attempting to isolate the role of infor-
mation diffusion in women’s social networks. In principle, facilities constructed 
around the birth of a first child will also tend to persist within mother so that they 
are available to her further births even if the share of women in government has 
changed. However, there is widespread absenteeism of medical practitioners from 
public health facilities (Muralidharan et al. 2011) so, in contrast to information, the 
effective availability of facilities will tend to vary within mother.
Heterogeneity in Household Status.—Since child mortality is concentrated 
amongst the poor, our finding of impacts of politician gender on mortality establish 
the progressiveness of women in state assemblies, in contradiction of debates that 
currently block the institution of quotas for women at this level (see Section II). 
We investigated this further by allowing the effects of politician gender to differ by 
the caste, wealth and rural/urban location of the family (Table 5). The coefficients 
are larger for lower castes, consistent with their greater “treatability.” They exhibit 
an inverted U-shape in wealth, with the smallest effects apparent for the poorest 
17 The smaller coefficients are consistent with migrant women and children being matched in the data to politi-
cians who had no influence on them because at least some of the migrants (those who moved district) had moved 
away from their domain.
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20  percent of households. A likely explanation of this is that the productivity of 
public intervention is contingent upon private inputs and that women in the poorest 
households are harder to “treat” because they have lower stocks of health before 
birth or because they are less likely to take up publicly provided prenatal care. It 
may also be that wealth is correlated with education which, in turn, is correlated 
with preferences for health and with the ability to access and process relevant infor-
mation.18 We also investigated differences by the caste of politicians. We find no 
difference in impact: the coefficients differ by about half a standard error (online 
Appendix Table A8).19
Gender-Specific Impacts.—Earlier studies suggest that as women’s power in deci-
sion making within the household increases marginal gains for girls exceed those 
18 The rates of of neonatal and infant mortality in the higher status groups are not small. In the high-caste group, 
the means are close to 5.2 and 8.1 percent and in the top-40 percent of the wealth distribution they are 4.9 and 7.6 
percent.
19 This result stands in contrast to Clots-Figueras (2011) who finds that redistributive policy choices are driven 
by low-caste women (see Section I). The difference may arise from our focus upon reproductive and child health 
(which women of all social groups may be motivated to improve—refer to Campbell 2004 cited in Section I), 
but our results are not strictly comparable since we analyze individual outcomes while the earlier study analyzes 
 state-level aggregates.
Table 5—Heterogeneity in Impact: Individual Variables. Neonatal Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A              
Fraction of seats in −0.2528* −0.0760 −0.1432* −0.5677** −0.2648* −0.1715 −0.1911
 district won by female
 politicians (women)
(0.152) (0.081) (0.079) (0.253) (0.143) (0.160) (0.142)
Sample First child Subsequent rural Urban Sc/ST oBc Higher caste
children
Observations 18,562 52,936 56,273 15,225 21,827 23,134 26,537
Number of mothers     14,401 4,353 5,416 6,085 7,253
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fraction of seats in −0.1469 −0.2199** −0.3228** −0.2050 −0.3366** −0.2458*
 district won by female
 politicians (women)
(0.138) (0.112) (0.153) (0.156) (0.159) (0.143)
Sample Girls Boys Girls Girls Girls Boys
control Gender first Gender first Gender Gender
child child siblings siblings
Observations 27,886 31,871 17,025 18,699 17,025 18,699
Number of mothers 9,845 11,797 6,278 7,199 6,278 7,199
Panel c (1) (2) (3)    
Fraction of seats in −0.0703 −0.3494*** −0.1219
 district won by female
 politicians (women)
(0.179) (0.131) (0.170)
Sample Wealth bottom Wealth mid Wealth top
control 20% 40% 40%
Observations 19,217 30,823 20,558
Number of mothers 4,728 7,967 5,862
Notes: See notes to Table 2. The controls are those in the baseline model, see Table 2, column 6. Columns in the top 
panel separate first and higher birth orders, rural and urban births, SC/ST, OBC, and higher caste births. In panel 
B the columns separate girls and boys, births in households in the bottom 20% of the wealth distribution, the mid 
40 percent, and the top 40 percent. We do not use mother fixed effects in the first two columns since a mother has 
only one first-born child by definition.
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for boys (e.g., Duflo 2003, Thomas 1990). So, if politician identity influences policy 
outcomes then it is plausible that women politicians make a larger difference for 
girls, for example, by campaigning against son preference. So we investigated dif-
ferences by child gender (Table 5). Using the baseline specification, we find slightly 
larger point estimates for boys, but the difference is not statistically significant. We 
Table 6—Heterogeneity in Impact: Political Variables. Neonatal Mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A        
Fraction of seats in district won by female −0.2043** −0.2241*** −0.2347**
 politicians (women) (0.083) (0.079) (0.091)
Women interacted with a dummy for years −0.0118
 after 1993 (0.119)
Women interacted with political competition 0.0597
 index (0.060)
Women interacted with dummy for female −0.8425***
 chief minister (0.205)
Women belonging to the same party as the −0.2109**
 chief minister (0.092)
Women belonging to a different party from the −0.1995**
 chief minister (0.085)
p-value joint significance of women and
 interacted terms
0.0255 0.0162 0.000
Observations 71,498 71,498 52,474 71,498
Number of mothers 18,754 18,754 15,664 18,754
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B          
Fraction of seats in district won by female −0.1943** −0.1895** −0.2014** −0.2116** −0.2837***
 politicians (women) (0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.091) (0.109)
Women interacted with turnout −0.0313
(0.066)
Women interacted with female turnout −0.0355
(0.074)
Women interacted with female/male turnout ratio −0.0265
(0.080)
Women interacted with newspaper circulation −0.1310
(0.205)
Women interacted with newspaper circulation 0.0199
 English (0.119)
Women interacted with newspaper circulation 0.1390
 Hindi (0.214)
Women interacted with newspaper circulation −0.1547
 Regional (0.291)
p-value joint significance of women and
 interacted terms
0.0468 0.0095 0.0378 0.0568 0.0731
Observations 71,498 69,306 69,306 69,507 52,644
Number of mothers 18,754 18,589 18,589 18,258 15,639
Notes: See notes to Table 2. The controls are those in the baseline model, column 6 in Table 2. In panel A, col-
umn 1 we interact a post-1993 dummy with the variable of interest (women). In column 2, we interact the variable 
of interest with the Besley and Burgess (2002) index of political competition. In column 3, we interact the variable 
of interest with a dummy for whether the chief minister was a woman. In column 4, we create variables denoting 
the share of female politicians that do and do not belong to the same political party as the chief minister. In panel B, 
columns 1, 2, and 3, we interact with turnout, female turnout, and the ratio of male to female turnout. In column 4, 
we interact with newspaper circulation (Besley and Burgess 2002), and in column 5 we interact with newspaper cir-
culation by language (Besley and Burgess 2002). Political competition, turnout and newspaper circulation are con-
verted to z-scores before they are included in the model.
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probed this result by including in the model proxies for son preference. First we 
include a dummy for the sex of the first-born child, as previous research shows 
that this is quasi-random and has a discernible impact on the tendency for parents 
to exercise son preference (e.g., Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). The coefficient for 
girls is now much larger than that for boys and statistically significant, in favor of 
our motivating hypothesis. However it remains insignificantly different form the 
coefficient for boys. We also display results using controls for the sex composition 
of the entire sibship surviving to the birth of the index child (for instance, one boy, 
one girl, a girl and a boy, and so on). The results are similar to those for the more 
parsimonious indicator. Note that these estimates are for the sample of children of 
second or higher birth order. Since controlling for the exercise of son preference 
does raise the point estimate for girls, we reran the baseline model which pools gen-
der (Table 2 column 6) with these controls. The point estimate increases to −0.23 
and −0.24 respectively which is insignificantly different from the baseline −0.21.
Pre/post Devolution.—The 1993 constitutional amendment described in 
Section II devolved control over the implementation of development programs to 
the panchayat level, and this included aspects of health provision such as drink-
ing water and immunization delivered through the Integrated Child Development 
Services program. We therefore allow for a weakening of the influence of politi-
cians in state assemblies postdevolution. The estimated effect is 10 percent larger 
(in absolute value) after 1993 but not significantly different (Table 6, column 1, 
panel A).20 This tells us that women’s political representation at the state level mat-
tered through the three decades in our sample, and their power was not substantially 
eroded upon the empowerment of village councils.
Heterogeneity by Political Variables.—Previous work has shown that political 
competition disciplines politicians, making them more responsive to the needs of 
citizens (Besley and Burgess 2002) but there is no evidence of whether there is any 
effective interaction between political competition and political identity. If male and 
female politicians were perfect substitutes then we would expect to observe better 
policy outcomes in areas with strong political competition but not as a function of 
the gender of the leader. However if men and women having “separate spheres” of 
influence driven by their different preferences, competition may enhance domain-
specific gender differences in policy outcomes.21 To investigate this, we interact 
party competition with the share of women politicians. As in Besley and Burgess 
(2002), we also interact turnout and newspaper circulation with the share of women 
politicians. The interaction terms are poorly determined but the point estimates are 
sizeable (Table 6). They indicate that turnout and news circulation (especially in the 
20 Following Iyer et al. (2012), we created a postreservation dummy that varies at the state × year level reflect-
ing the state-specific implementation of the village level reform. Interactions with this dummy are similarly 
insignificant.
21 There are other possibilities. If women’s preferences for health are a “luxury,” they may be overridden in com-
petitive conditions. If women are marginal voters, women’s preferences may hold greater sway under competition. 
If, as lay evidence suggests, women politicians receive more newspaper coverage than their male counterparts then 
the discipline flowing from increased newspaper circulation may result in greater effectiveness amongst women 
relative to men in government.
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regional language, as found in Besley and Burgess 2002) tend to enhance the policy 
influence of women, while party competition tends to lower it.
We also investigated the relevance of the gender and party of the chief minis-
ter to allow, for instance, that legislators are more likely to receive funds for their 
 constituencies or have their voice heard if their preferences are more closely aligned 
with those of the chief minister. We find that belonging to the chief minister’s party 
does not alter the impact of women legislators. However, when the chief minister 
is a woman, there is a large and significant increase in the effectiveness of women 
legislators (Table 6). We conducted a further interaction (not shown) with political 
parties classified as left and right leaning and other, but could identify no significant 
difference in the effectiveness of women by their party affiliation. These results 
underline that we identify gender rather than party effects.
Postneonatal mortality.—We estimated the model for postneonatal mortality and 
found no effects of politician gender (Table A10 in the online Appendix).22 The most 
likely explanation of this is that the postneonatal mortality estimates are biased by 
endogenous selection into postneonatal exposure to mortality risk—children only 
enter this sample if they have survived the neonatal period, and we have seen that 
neonatal survival is dependent upon politician gender. However the estimates for 
neonatal and infant mortality are unbiased (the selection issue does not arise since 
these indicators are defined for all children exposed from birth). The fact that the 
neonatal and infant mortality estimates are of similar size suggests that reductions 
in neonatal mortality account for almost all of the infant mortality reduction flowing 
from increases in women’s representation.
This is consistent with the tighter identification of neonatal mortality with public 
health investments in women (maternal health, breastfeeding, place of delivery). 
As children age into the postneonatal period, they are exposed to a more diverse set 
of household-level influences including income, nutrition, and aspects of parenting 
behavior like hygiene. It becomes harder to attribute improvements in postneonatal 
health to public provision and this presumably weakens politician incentives. Also, 
there is growing evidence that health interventions are more productive the earlier 
in childhood they are made (Almond and Currie 2011; Bhalotra and Venkataramani 
2013): this too rationalizes investments that improve health in the first month (neona-
tal) as more productive than investments that improve health after (post-neonatal).23
Fertility.—By virtue of using mother fixed effects we have already accounted for 
endogenous variation in the composition of births. We now investigate the impact 
22 Mortality in the first month of life is neonatal and between the second and twelfth month is postneonatal. 
Infant mortality is the sum of these. Mortality risk declines sharply with age, and neonatal mortality contributes 
two-thirds of infant deaths. Amongst children who died before the age of 5 in our sample, 50 percent died before the 
age of one month (neonatal), 29 percent between one month and one year (postneonatal infant) and the remaining 
21 percent of deaths occurred between the ages of one and five years. The risk of death for children who survive 
to the age of five is considerably smaller. Since the presence of women politicians has a mortality-deterring effect, 
survivors at the margin are negatively selected (see for instance, Bozzoli, Deaton, and Quintana-Domeque (2009) 
on the relative roles of selection and “treatment”).
23 We also investigated under-5 mortality and mortality rates up until age 14 (online Appendix Table A11). The 
coefficients are consistently negative but statistically insignificant. The selection and attribution arguments above 
apply a fortiori here.
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of politician gender on the probability that a child is born, and the sex of the child 
conditional upon birth, instrumenting with the outcome of close elections as before. 
As we have the entire fertility history of each mother, we expanded the data so that 
for every woman there is an observation for every year in which she is exposed to 
the risk of birth (starting with her age at marriage and stopping at age 49 or the date 
of interview). We find no significant change in the probability of a birth.
Having established that the probability of a further birth (conditional upon the last 
observed) is not endogenous, we can proceed to estimate child sex conditional upon 
birth. We find that the probability that a birth is female is increasing in the share of 
women politicians (online Appendix Table A12). A ready explanation of this would 
be that women politicians have been more committed to controlling female feticide, 
although we were unable to nail this down.24 
Note that to the extent that women politicians lower female feticide this will 
create a mechanical increase in fertility which may be balancing out a decline in 
fertility flowing from the decline in neonatal mortality induced by raising women’s 
representation.
VI. Channels
In this section, we investigate the mechanisms underlying our finding that neona-
tal mortality responds to female political representation. We analyze the influence 
of women’s representaton on a range of indicators of antenatal and postnatal care at 
the mother level and health infrastructure at the village level.
A. Individual Indicators of Antenatal and Postnatal care
We investigated prenatal and early postnatal health-seeking behaviors that are 
known to impact upon early life mortality.25 These data are available for births that 
occur in the four years preceding the survey date (1994–1995 to 1998–1999). There 
are siblings in this sample (for 15.3 percent of mothers) but they are characterized 
by short intervening birth intervals and given the evidence that a short preced-
ing birth interval compromises the health of a child (e.g., Bhalotra and van Soest 
2008), this is a selected sample. So, while we use the close-elections instrument 
as before, instead of mother fixed effects, we use fixed effects for finely defined 
mother-groups, an approach similar to that taken in Kudamatsu (2012). We con-
struct fixed effects for groups defined on a multidimensional space of mother traits, 
namely height (above/below mean), education (above/below primary), caste (SC, 
24 To test this hypothesis, we divided the sample at 1985, because ultrasound scanners started to be imported in 
1987 and thereafter widely used for prenatal sex detection and it is only after the mid-80s that there is a significant 
trend departure of the sex ratio at birth from the biologically normal level (Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). Our 
expectation was that we would see a positive impact of female political representation on the female-male ratio at 
birth after and only after 1985. However the post-85 coefficients are imprecise and we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that they are equal before and after 1985.
25 Since the samples we use for estimation of equations for survival and for health inputs are constrained to be 
different, we cannot conduct an accounting exercise measuring the contributions of the inputs to neonatal mortality 
but the inputs we consider exhibit the expected correlations with neonatal and infant survival.
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ST, OBC, or high caste), urban/rural location and the birth year of the mother26 and 
include these along with district fixed effects. The estimated equation system other-
wise looks similar to (1) and (2).27
The results are in Table 7 and the mean and SD of each dependent variable 
is in Table 1A. As in Table 2, OLS estimates (not shown) are smaller than the 
IV estimates and tend to be insignificant. The table displays 2SLS estimates with 
and without the quasi-mother fixed effects. Here we discuss the richer specifica-
tion and present effects flowing from a 10 percentage point increase in women’s 
 representation which, we explained above, is the approximate change in share 
associated with moving the number of women politicians elected in the median 
district from 0 to 1.
Antenatal care, Iron, and Tetanus.—The Indian government defines a complete 
course of antenatal care as including at least three antenatal visits, a three-month 
supply of iron tablets and two tetanus injections. Only 37 percent of women in our 
sample achieve a complete course. We find that women’s political  representation 
26 This generates about 3,000 fixed effects in a sample of just under 19,000 mothers.
27 The samples used in this and the following section are different from the samples used to analyze mortality. 
We have checked that the first stage is still very powerful; F-statistics and reduced form equations available on 
request.
Table 7—Health Seeking Behaviors
Number of 
antenatal visits
Iron and folic 
supplements
Tetanus injection
in pregnancy
Breastfed 
first 24 hrs
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A
Fraction of seats in district 3.6524** 2.7745* 1.0663*** 0.9518** 0.1798 0.3113 1.2758*** 1.3406**
 won by female  
 politicians (women)
(1.783) (1.662) (0.364) (0.429) (0.320) (0.376) (0.462) (0.535)
District FE x x x x x x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x x x
Mother group FE x x x x
F first stage 155.001 124.482 164.951 131.19 164.401 130.846 167.418 132.767
Observations 7,448 7,448 8,429 8,429 8,383 8,383 8,062 8,062
                 
Delivery
 at home
Delivery at government 
institution
Delivery at private 
institution
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B
Fraction of seats in district −0.8698** −0.8768* 1.0344*** 1.0904*** −0.1646 −0.2136
 won by female
 politicians (women)
(0.433) (0.522) (0.346) (0.394) (0.344) (0.350)
District FE x x x x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x
Mother group FE x x x
F first stage 164.382 130.572 164.382 130.572 164.382 130.572
Observations 8,408 8,408 8,408 8,408 8,408 8,408
Notes: See notes to Table 2. As in Table 2, women is instrumented with womenclose. Means of the dependent vari-
ables are in Table 1. mother group FE are defined in the text, they are FE defined over multiple dimensions of 
mother-level observables.
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increases the number of antenatal visits a woman makes by 0.28, which is 12  percent 
of the mean. It raises the probability that iron supplements are taken by about 10 per-
centage points, relative to a mean of 57 percent. This is important given the high 
prevalence of anemia amongst Indian mothers (NFHS data) and the fact that it is a 
risk factor for low birth weight offspring and child survival (Bhalotra and Rawlings 
(2010). The probability that a woman has at least one tetanus injection during preg-
nancy (which is important in lowering the risk of neonatal tetanus) is increasing in 
women but not significantly.
Breastfeeding.—Women’s political representation raises the probability of 
early breastfeeding by 13.4 percentage points, which is a 28 percent increase. 
Breastfeeding has been shown to influence the cognitive and emotional develop-
ment of children (Del Bono and Rabe 2012). Although the vast majority of Indian 
women breastfeed and 77 percent of children are being breastfed at 20–23 months 
(UNICEF indicators), there are cultural inhibitions to breastfeeding immediately 
after birth and only 48 percent of Indian women in our sample initiate breastfeeding 
in the first 24 hours. This is when the benefits of breastfeeding are greatest, lower-
ing the risk of contracting infectious diseases such as diarrhea and pneumonia and, 
thereby, lowering neonatal mortality risk (Jones et al. 2003).
Place of Birth.—Some 69 percent of births to Indian women in our sample occur 
at home, while the remaining 31 percent are distributed equally between public and 
private facilities.28 Since home births are typically unattended by professionals, they 
generate neonatal survival risks that can be averted in the presence of birth atten-
dants trained in the management of sepsis (septicemia, meningitis, pneumonia); see 
Bang et al. (1999). We find that a 10 percentage point increase in women’s political 
representation lowers home deliveries by 8.8 percentage points. Moreover, there is 
evidence that this represents a shift of births into government hospitals: the same 
increase in women raises the probability of giving birth in a government facility by 
11 percentage points while there is no significant change in the probability of giving 
birth in a private facility. Contrast this with the impact of a 10 percent increase in 
state income: this similarly lowers home deliveries (by a more modest 1.1 percent-
age points) but this arises entirely from a shift towards private sector deliveries; 
there is no change in the share of births in government hospitals (Bhalotra 2010). 
This suggests that putting women at the helm leads to improved access to govern-
ment hospitals, consistent with the results in the next section.
B. Village Public Goods
We now investigate how women’s political representation influences tangible sup-
ply side investments. For this we use the underused village facilities survey of the 
NFHS to look at rural infrastructure choices. Facility is an indicator for a  specified 
28 The share of home births is higher in rural areas, at 78 percent, compared with 33 percent in urban areas. The 
share of the residual births in public and private facilities is similar in rural and urban areas.
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facility in village v in district d in year t. Instrumenting for the district share of 
women as before, we estimate this linear equation system using 2SLS:
(3) facilityvdt = αd + θt + β womendt−1 +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  ∂ 1j  I jdt × F( m jdt ) 
 +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  ∂ 2j  I jdt + λ totalclosedt−1 + Zdt μ + εimdt
(4) womendt = χd + ωt + τ womenclosedt +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  ∂ 1j  I jdt × F( m jdt )
 +  ∑ 
j=1
N
  ∂ 2j  I jdt + ψ totalclosedt + Zdt π + εimdt .
The estimation sample contains 1,591 villages (in the 246 districts), 76 percent of 
which are surveyed in 1998 and the rest in 1997.29 As in the baseline specification 
for mortality, women is measured in the year before birth. We find that village pub-
lic facilities vary significantly with the share of women politicians in the district 
in which the village lies (Table 8). The estimates are sharp and consistent across 
categories. A 10 percentage point increase in women raises the probability that the 
village has a primary health center, a community health center, a government dis-
pensary and a government hospital by 0.22, 0.19, 0.18, and 0.057 respectively.
With a view to identifying the sorts of village infrastructure that male politicians 
are more likely to provide, we ran the regressions reported in panel B of Table 8. 
A 10 percentage point increase in the share of women politicians (which decreases 
the share of male politicians) significantly lowers the probability that the village 
has a bank. We also observe sizeable negative coefficients on indicators for post 
offices and telephone facilities, although these are poorly determined.30 In sum, the 
evidence suggests that women politicians are significantly more likely to invest in 
the public health infrastructure while men are more likely to invest in the financial 
and telecommunications infrastructure. This defends our initial hypothesis. While 
we control for voter (and mother) characteristics, we are unable to control for politi-
cian characteristics. Therefore, some part of the relationships that we identify may 
flow from women who win in close [political] races against men being positively 
selected. However our finding that women favor health over financial infrastructure 
suggests that preferences do play a role. 
29 The reported results are conditional upon year and district fixed effects, but the coefficient of interest is insen-
sitive to dropping the district effects.
30 So as to investigate the impact of these policy choices on state income, we used state-level panel data, instru-
menting with close elections. We find no impact of the share of women in state assemblies on state income, by 
which measure it would appear that raising the political representation of women is a cost-effective way of improv-
ing public health.
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C. Discussion
We have identified significant impacts of women’s political representation on a 
range of indicators of prenatal care, immunization, place of birth and breastfeed-
ing, and on different dimensions of the village-level health infrastructure. This indi-
cates the sorts of things that politicians do towards improving public health services, 
suggesting the mechanisms underlying our finding that childhood mortality rates 
respond to women’s representation.
We argue that the improvements in health-seeking behaviors are consistent with 
both infrastructure and information improvements. An advantage of studying out-
comes (i.e., Does a child survive? Does a mother receive iron supplements? etc.) 
rather than direct inputs such as infrastructure or expenditure is not only that they 
reflect the effectiveness of inputs but also that they capture complementary policy 
influences including information campaigns. Information is important in the health 
domain. For example, Miller (2008) finds that door-to-door campaigns advocat-
ing home hygiene played a critical role in the steep decline in infant mortality in 
American history, and the uptake of publicly provided health services in India 
appears to be limited because people do not fully recognize the benefits (Banerjee 
et al. 2010). Information may act in either of two ways: to encourage the uptake 
of public services (such as antenatal care), or to encourage private inputs (such as 
Table 8—Village Public Goods
Primary Primary Community Government Government
Variables health subcenter health center health center dispensary hospital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Fraction of seats in 3.4769 2.2365** 1.8871** 1.7857** 0.5682*
 district won by
 female politicians
 (women)
(2.215) (1.120) (0.849) (0.900) (0.311)
Year dummies x x x x x
District dummies x x x x x
Observations 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558
r2 0.326 0.342 0.354 0.370 0.210
Post Telegraph STD (telephone)
Variables Electricity Bank office booth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel B
Fraction of seats in 0.9865 −2.4616* −2.1704 0.6037 −0.9293
 district won by
 female politicians
 (women)
(1.225) (1.494) (2.218) (1.241) (1.589)
Year dummies x x x x x
District dummies x x x x x
Observations 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558
r2 0.455 0.280 0.306 0.231 0.238
Notes: See notes to Table 2. As in Table 2, women is instrumented with womenclose. All regressions include districts 
and year dummies and population controls. The means of the dependent variables are in Table 1. The F-statistic of 
the first-stage regressions is 45.973.
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breastfeeding). Since breastfeeding does not require public infrastructure, the iden-
tified impact of women’s representation on breastfeeding directly indicates a role 
for information campaigns. Also, the survey data we use asked women what inhib-
ited them in making antenatal care visits and as many as 60 percent said that they 
did not think it was necessary, which suggests the potential for information cam-
paigns to generate large improvements in the use of antenatal care.31 As discussed in 
Section VC, our finding that the largest impact of women’s representation is on the 
first birth of a mother is also consistent with a role for information.
Although it is useful to look at timing, we cannot discriminate between informa-
tion and infrastructure mechanisms based upon timing alone. While building new 
facilities may take more than a year, it is often the case in rural India that an existing 
building is brought into use so that in principle infrastructure can be raised within 
the space of a year. Moreover, politicians can act fairly rapidly to influence staffing 
and supplies in facilities or to discourage absenteeism among health providers (see 
Chaudhury et al. 2006, Muralidharan et al. 2011) by improving monitoring and 
incentives. In these ways politicians may improve the effectiveness of facilities (and 
hence mortality rates) without any construction of infrastructure.32
It is difficult to specify the trade-off involved in (randomly) replacing a woman 
with a man in political office without having a full specification of the influence of 
each on the entire portfolio of policies, but we noted earlier that raising the share 
of women relative to men leads to more public health infrastructure and less rural 
banking infrastructure. The premise for favoring an increase in women’s political 
participation must be that this balances the representation of women’s interests 
against those of men.
VII. Conclusions
We investigated whether women politicians invest more in antenatal care and 
early child health because women incur the costs of reproduction and replacement 
fertility and they make greater investments in the early life health of their offspring. 
We identify significant causal impacts of women’s political representation on neo-
natal survival, uptake of reproductive and postnatal care, and the village level public 
health infrastructure. The estimated impacts are large, suggesting that raising wom-
en’s political representation may be an effective and novel way of improving public 
health delivery in developing countries. Women’s representation at the state level 
is a live issue in the Indian Parliament today, and quotas for women in government 
have been established in more than 100 countries in the last 15 years (Dahlerup and 
Francisco 2005). Our findings are relevant to debates concerning political reserva-
tions, especially in view of recent evidence that women holding office paves the 
way for competitively determined participation of women in politics (Beaman et 
31 Access to publicly provided care is clearly relevant too since the next highest frequency, 16 percent, was 
recorded for it costing too much. Only 3.5 percent said it was too inconvenient or too far and 1.6 percent said it was 
because a health worker did not visit.
32 There may be complementarities in the outcomes we look at and between provision of facilities and informa-
tion, for example, mothers who give birth in a facility rather than at home are more likely to receive information and 
encouragement to initiate breastfeeding soon after birth.
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al. 2009; Bhavnani 2009; Deininger, Jin, and Nagarajan 2011; Casas-Arce and Saiz 
2011; Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, and Iyer 2013). 
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